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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-4-i03(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
a. Res judicata. 
i) The Court below held that Appellant's claims were barred by res 
judicata. 
ii) Standard of Review. "[A]ppellant argues only that the... petition was 
barred by res judicata. Therefore, this appeal presents a question of law. Accepting 
the trial court's factual findings, we review its conclusions of law for correctness, 
according them no particular deference." In re: J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161,162 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (internal citations omitted). 
b. Rule 11 Sanctions. 
i) The Court below granted Appellees' Motion for sanctions pursuant to 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. 
ii) Standard of Review. "When reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 
determination, we review the trial court's findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard, the trial court's conclusion that Rule 11 was violated under a 
correction of error standard, and the trial court's determination of the type and 
amount of sanction to be imposed under an abuse of discretion standard." 
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) citing 
Barnard v. Sutlijf, 846 P.2d 1229,1235 (Utah 1992). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: This appeal is from two final Orders issued by the 
Honorable Judge Robert K. Hilder, in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Summit County, Utah, on motions to dismiss made by Defendants/Appellees 
("Appellees") and on a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. This dispute is about access 
to a parcel of land that is essentially landlocked. As a result of a prior 
interpretation of a settlement agreement between some persons related to the 
parties in this action, the parcel of property is accessible only to 
Plaintiff/Appellant ("Gillmor") and a few others and only for very limited 
purposes, animal husbandry and hunting. The road to the property has been in 
use by the public as a thoroughfare for at least one hundred years for numerous 
purposes. 
b. Course of the proceedings: Gillmor filed a Complaint seeking private 
condemnation and/or "highway-by-use" over Appellees' lands. Appellees filed 
Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing judicial estoppel and res 
judicata. Gillmor opposed the Motions to Dismiss, arguing that her Complaint 
contains new claims, parties not included in the previous actions and on other 
grounds. Appellees also filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. 
c. Disposition at trial court: The District Court below granted the Motion 
to Dismiss only on the grounds of res judicata. Following the Order Granting the 
Motion to Dismiss, Appellees were also granted Rule 11(b)(2) sanctions. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
Gillmor owns property that is effectively landlocked as a result of 
topography and a prior court ruling. See, Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351. 
The Appellees own lands that stand between Gillmor's property and the most 
convenient presently declared public road. The Appellees have been unwilling to 
allow Gillmor to have reasonable access to her property. This action was brought 
under two unconventional legal theories to gain Gillmor access to her property -
"highway-by-use" (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (2001)) and condemnation. This is 
the first time an action was brought that includes all the property owners that 
block Gillmor's property from access to a road and the first time that these claims 
have been raised. 
Previously, in 1984, Gillmor's deceased husband, Frank Gillmor, brought 
an action against only the largest landowner between Gillmor's property and the 
main Weber Canyon Road, David K. Richards. In that action Mr. Gillmor sought 
access to the Gillmor property by either a prescriptive easement or an irrevocable 
license across Mr. Richards property. That action ended over 20 years ago with a 
settlement agreement between Mr. Richards and Mr. Gillmor providing for some 
access to the Gillmor property across Mr. Richards' property. 
Another action was later brought in 2001 by Ms. Gillmor against Mr. 
Richards to determine and enforce the terms of the prior settlement agreement so 
that Gillmor and others could continue to access the Gillmor property. That 
action ended when the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the settlement 
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agreement and left Gillmor's property essentially landlocked, all but for her and a 
limited few others for very limited purposes. The Court of Appeals specifically 
found that the easement created in the agreement did not run with the land and 
would not inure to a future landowner, or even to Gillmor's children (by a 
marriage prior to her marriage to Frank Gillmor). Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT 
App 351,1f1fi9 and 23. 
This action arises not from the 1984 settlement agreement but instead from 
Gillmor's statutory rights. Importantly, since the Court of Appeals decision, 
"highway-by-use" law has changed in Utah. 
In this action, unlike the previous two actions, Gillmor does not seek an 
easement over anyone else's property or any legal redress based on the settlement 
agreement, instead she brings new claims. Moreover, this action is brought 
against all the landowners who block her property from declared public roads, not 
just Mr. Richards and his successors-in-interest, in order to access her property. 
The Appellees' filed Motions to Dismiss under two theories. The District 
Court rejected the Appellees'judicial estoppel argument but granted the Motion 
on the grounds of res judicata. Thereafter the Appellees' filed a Motion for Rule 
11 Sanctions that the District Court granted.1 
1 Gillmor concedes that Appellees followed proper procedure about advance warning 
that Appellees would seek Rule 11 sanctions. Appellees gave Gillmor advance warning 
that Rule 11 sanctions would be sought under both the res judicata and judicial estoppel 
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This case involves new parties and different claims than those previously 
decided. Therefore it is not barred by res judicata and sanctions should not have 
been granted. See Complaint, Second Amended Complaint and Amended 
Complaint, attached to the Docketing Statement as Exhibits D, E and F. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Gillmor's Complaint was not barred by res judicata because these claims 
have never been brought and this is the first case to involve all of the landowners 
that block Gillmor's property access. Additionally, Rule 11 sanctions were not 
appropriate in this case because there was no bad faith and Gillmor (and her 
counsel) had no intent to defraud or harass Appellees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. No prior legal action was res judicata. 
Simply put, res judicata does not apply in this case: 
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must 
involve the same parties or their privies and also the 
same cause of action; and this precludes the relitigation 
of all issues that could have been litigated as well as 
those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action 
theories. The District Court found that the judicial estoppel argument lacked merit. 
Gillmor chose not to escalate this tit-for-tat battle by seeking Rule 11 sanctions against 
Appellees for their efforts on the judicial estoppel theory. 
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Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Neither of the two requirements for res judicata is met because this suit 
involves different parties and this suit involves different causes of action. 
Gillmor's case is surprisingly similar to the facts in Schaer, which also 
involved multiple lawsuits and property access. In Schaer the State of Utah 
condemned 4.6 acres of Schaer's 22.8 acre property to build a highway in 1967. 
Schaer asked for and received severance damages because the condemnation 
landlocked the remainder of his property. The Court specifically found that the 
action left the remainder property with no access. 
Over a decade later Schaer instituted another suit seeking an access road to 
the remainder of the property so he could develop it for residential use. The Utah 
Supreme Court found that res judicata did not bar his second case: 
because it is based on a different claim, demand or 
cause of action than that of the 1967 litigation. The two 
causes of action rest on a different state of facts and 
evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to 
sustain the two causes of action. Moreover, the evidence 
of the two causes of action relates to the status of the 
property in two completely different and separate time 
periods. 
Id. (emphasis added). Gillmor's case is similarly not barred by res judicata since 
either a declaration of condemnation or "highway-by-use" to access the property 
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require a different state of facts and evidence then interpreting a private 
settlement agreement between two parties. 
fWlhere the second cause of action between the same 
parties is upon a different cause or demand, the 
principle of res judicata is applied much more narrowly. 
In this situation, the judgment in the prior action 
operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might 
have been litigated and determined, but 'only as to those 
matters in issue or points controverted, upon the 
determination of which the finding or verdict was 
rendered/ Since the cause of action involved in the 
second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in 
the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which 
were not at issue in the first proceeding, even though 
such points might have been tendered and decided at 
that time. 
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). Gillmor is entitled to have a court determine whether 
she can access her property via condemnation or "highway-by-use" due to the 
"completely different and separate time period" of the actions and because these 
points were "not at issue in the first proceeding". "[W]e resolve all doubts in favor 
of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy". 
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BYUv. Tremco, 2006 UT 19, U28 (citation omitted). If there is any doubt whether 
res judicata exists here the doubt should be resolved in Gillmor's favor and this 
dispute should be remanded to the trial court so that she can have her day in 
court. 
Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992) also supports 
Gillmor's position. In Hill the parties were involved in a contract dispute. A first 
action was brought and concluded in federal court regarding the contract 
between the parties and then a second action based on the same claims was 
brought in state court. 
Because we hold that the prior federal court proceeding 
never fully explored the contractual relationship 
between Hill-Magnum and Seattle First, collateral 
estoppel does not prevent Hill-Mangum from 
relitigating the issue. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
After the federal court's decision, Hill-Mangum brought 
the same claims against Seattle First in state court, 
alleging, inter alia, that Seattle First ... breach[ed] an 
oral contract with Hill-Mangum. Id. at 244 (emphasis 
added). 
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We agree that the federal court ruling bars any claim 
Hill-Magnum might base on the written agreement. 
However, to the extent that the trial court relied on 
collateral estoppel to bar an enquiry into the rights 
created by an oral agreement, it erred. Id. 
Both of the claims in Hill were based in contract yet the Court allowed the second 
case to proceed based on an oral contract because the first case only resolved the 
written contract. Similarly Gillmor should not be precluded from seeking access 
to her property against all landowners that block her access with claims that have 
never been brought or reached by any court. 
Although the District Court dismissed this action based on res judicata2, an 
analysis of why this case should also have not been dismissed on preclusion 
grounds is helpful because courts have often overlapped the doctrines of claim 
and issue preclusion when deciding a case on res judicata grounds (See, BYUv. 
Tremco, 2005 UT 19,1f1f 24 - 38). There are four tests courts apply when 
determining if a case is barred by collateral estoppel, also known as preclusion: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
2 It is not clear whether the District Court granted res judiciata on the grounds of the 
1984 dispute or the 2001 dispute. 
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2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated? 
Schaer at 1340-41. Neither tests one or three are satisfied in this case. 
The first test is not satisfied because the 1984 case only involved access to 
the property over Mr. Richards' property through a license or an easement. The 
2001 case only involved interpreting the agreement that settled the 1984 case. 
The current dispute involves access, not as an easement or a license, over all of 
the land, not only Mr. Richards', that blocks Gillmor's property. "We [must, 
therefore,] determine whether the issues actually litigated in the first action are 
precisely the same as those raised in the present action." Schaer at 1341 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). This litigation involves "highway-by-
use" and condemnation and "the issue[s] raised in th[is action were] never 
litigated in the prior proceeding[s]" so Gillmor's Complaint is not barred by res 
judicata. Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978). 
The 1967 litigation was a condemnation action which 
focused on whether the plaintiffs remaining property 
was effectively landlocked. Despite vague and indirect 
references to the dugway road, the IQ67 litigation never 
focused on the precise issue of whether the dugway road 
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was a public thoroughfare under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-
89 [the predecessor to the current Utah Code Ann. §72-
5-104]-
•X- •* * 
inhere is nothing in its findings to preclude another 
court twelve years later from finding that access is not 
reasonable, economical and feasible by way of the 
dugway road. In any event, neither the findings nor the 
judgment entered in the IQ67 case demonstrates that 
the court considered and Ruled on the precise issue in 
this case... 
[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel 'does not apply to 
issues that merely could have been tried in the prior 
case, but operates only to issues that were actually 
asserted and tried in that case'. 
Schaer at 1341 (emphasis in original and added) (internal citations omitted). 
Similarly, Gillmor's causes of action in this case, condemnation and "highway-by-
use", have never been tried or asserted and these claims are not barred by the 
prior actions. 
Likewise, the third test is not satisfied because this case involves all of the 
landowners limiting access to the property. Claim or issue preclusion is only 
applicable when the case involves all of the same parties or the parties are all in 
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privity. Murdock et al v. Springville Municipal Corp., 1999 UT 39, H13. The 
previous actions only involved Mr, Richards or his successors-in-interest, so 
preclusion does not bar this action. 
II. Res judicata is additionally inapplicable in this case because there 
was a change in the law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes "the general Rule that res judicata is 
no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has 
been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation." 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154,162 (1945) 
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals decision created just such an altered 
situation for Gillmor when it lessened the access she believed that she had prior 
to the decision so res judicata should not have barred her from bringing this 
Complaint. 
Additionally there has been a change in the "highway-by-use" law, which 
allows Gillmor to bring her Complaint. The change in "highway-by-use" law 
supports Gillmor's request for access to her property: 
The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems largely 
from the fact that we have never set forth a standard for 
determining what qualifies as a sufficient interruption 
to restart the running of the required ten-year period 
under the Dedication Statute. We do so now by setting 
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forth a bright-line Rule by which we intend to make 
application of the Dedication Statute more predictable: 
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to 
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and 
is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an 
interruption sufficient to restart the running of the 
required ten-year period under the Dedication Statute. 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, U15 (emphasis added). This change 
in law precludes a finding of res judicata on the "highway-by-use" claim in 
Gillmor's Complaint. 
III. Sanctions should not have been awarded. 
Just because the Appellees' disagreed with Gillmor's position does not mean 
that Gillmor's counsel violated Rule 11 or that Appellees' are entitled to sanctions. 
All Rule 11 requires is good faith and that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry 
into the validity of the action, which Gillmor's attorney did. 
Because this action was not brought in contradiction of Rule 11 attorneys' fees 
should not have been awarded to the Appellees. 
[B]y presenting a pleading ... an attorney ... is certifying 
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, (b)(i) it is not being presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
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unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation; (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by 
a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law. 
* * * 
A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be 
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such 
conduct ... [T]he sanction may consist of, or include, 
directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or if imposed on motion and 
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing 
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct 
result of the violation. (c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions 
may not be awarded against a represented party for a 
violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 
Rule 11 has not been violated because this action was not frivolous. Before 
bringing this case, Gillmor's attorney did the research that Rule 11 requires: "Rule 11 
does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive research. The appropriate 
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standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all the 
circumstances". Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213,118, quoting Barnard v. Sutliff, 
846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992). "Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate where, as 
here, counsel's interpretation of existing law is reasonable and there is no evidence 
demonstrating counsel's failure to make a reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11". 
Id. at U26 (emphasis added). 
This case is not similar to Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) where the action was "no different from filing a new Complaint 
containing the original claims". Id. at 60, n. 1. Unlike in Schoney, Gillmor and her 
counsel, did not merely "file a new Complaint containing the original claims". 
Instead Gillmor's attorney researched the law and determined that Gillmor did have 
a basis to file this Complaint on these new theories, as explained above. 
"Thus, once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion after conducting 
appropriate research, the mere fact that the attorney's view of the law was wrong 
cannot support a finding of a Rule 11 violation". Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 
1236 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). Here Gillmor filed her Complaint to access 
her property and there have been changes in the law since the prior action. The 
District Court disagreed with Gillmor and found that her action was barred by res 
judicata. However, even ifres judicata barred a Complaint sanctions did not 
automatically follow. 
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Another important Utah case on sanctionss, Mi Vida Enters, v. Steen-Adams, 
2005 UT App 400, also supports the position that sanctions are not appropriate 
when an action was brought in good faith. Id. at U16. 
To find that a party acted in 'bad faith/ the trial court 
must find that one or more of the following factors 
existed: (i) the party lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party 
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or 
(iii) the party intended to or acted with the knowledge 
that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or 
defraud others. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). 
None of the elements of bad faith exist in this case. Gillmor did not intend to take 
advantage of the Appellees'. Gillmor did not intend to hinder, delay or defraud the 
Appellees'. Gillmor and her attorney honestly believe this case is allowable for 
3 This case is a Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 sanctions case but is applicable because as 
the District Court pointed out the bad faith test appears to be the same for Rule 11 
sanctions. 
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access to her property. Because none of the requirements of bad faith exist the 
Court should not have awarded sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
Gillmor's action is not barred by res judicata. This is the first times these 
claims have been brought by Gillmor and the first time all landowners who block 
her access have been included in any legal action. Additionally, Rule 11 was not 
violated and sanctions should not have been awarded. The Court of Appeals 
should reverse both Orders below, and return the case to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this " H ^ day of January, 2009. 
_Jhk 
Dallis A. Nordstrom 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment came before 
Judge Robert K. Milder on December 19, 2007. Plaintiff Nadine Gillmor was represented by 
Bruce R. Baird. Defendants Family Link, LLC, Robin Macey and Ken Macey (collectively the 
"Maceys") were represented by Keith Meade, defendant David K. Richards ("Richards") was 
represented by Elizabeth T. Dunning and defendants Doug Carl Dohring and Laurie Ann 
Dohring (the "Dohrings") were represented by Edwin C. Barnes. Having considered the 
pleadings and the argument of counsel and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of res judicata is granted as to both 
claims made in Plaintiffs Complaint, and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Res 
judicata bars all claims that were or could have been brought in prior litigation between the same 
parties or their privies concerning the same operative facts or controversy. Plaintiffs claims in 
this case could have been brought in Gillmor v. Macey el al, Civil No. 010600155, Third 
District Court 2001, or in Gillmor v. Richards, Civil No. 8065, Third District Court, 1984. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of judicial estoppel is denied. 
Plaintiff did not obtain relief in prior litigation based on any position which she is denying in this 
case. 
3. The Court, having decided to dismiss both of Plaintiff s claims on the basis of ray 
judicata, does not reach Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claim for condemnation on 
//2336G2 v| 
21 
the separate bases that Plaintiff has no authority to condemn Defendants' property and the 
proposed condemnation is not for a public use. 
3. Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on her claim for 
condemnation is denied as moot given the Court's ruling dismissing Plaintiffs Complaim with 
prejudice. 
.*" 
DATED t h i s / ^ "day of^*maryr2008. 
a^<^y^ 
APPROVE 
Rob6rt K. Milder 
«233662 vi 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed, postage fully 
prepaid, on the /^/ day of February, 2008 to the following: 
Bruce R. Baird 
IIUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL PLLC 
9537 South 700 East 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Christopher B. Snow 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
«31662 v l 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ' n'rcf Judicial District 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NADINE GILLMOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FAMILY LINK, LLC, a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, DAVID KL RICHARDS, 
an individual, BARRY TODD MILLER, an 
individual, JOAJN ELLEN MILLER, an 
individual, DOUG CARL DOHRING, as 
an individual and as Trustee, LAURIE 
ANN DOHRING, an individual, KENNETH 
W. MACEY, an individual, ROBIN A. 
MACEY, an individual, and JOHN DOES 
1-40, 
Defendants. 
JUL - 1 2008 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
RULING AND ORDER 
(Rule 11) 
Civil No. 070500385 
Judge Robert K Hilder 
All defendants in this action except Barry Todd Miller and Joan Ellen Miller have 
requested Rule 113 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions against plaintiff Nadine Gillmor and 
her attorney, Bruce R. Baird. Defendants Family Link and the Maceys (hereinafter "Maceys"), 
and defendant David K. Richards (hereinafter "Richards") filed the initial Motion jointly, and 
counsel for these defendants have taken the laboring oar in briefing and arguing the Motion. 
Defendants Doug Dohring and Laurie Dohring (hereinafter "Dobrings") subsequently joined in 
the otlier defendants5 Motion, but Dobrings did not add any independent analysis to the briefing. I 
also note that counsel for Maceys and Richards are the same counsel who represented these 
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parties in.the prior 2001 litigation (Nadine Gilhnor v. Family Link, et ah, Summit County Civil 
No. 010600155) that played a critical part in my dismissal of this case on defendants' Motion, 
and that now plays an important part in determination of the present Rule 11 Motion, I also note 
that I was the trial judge for that action. Mr. Baird was not Ms. Gillmor's counsel in that action. 
The Motion was argued to me on April 4, 2008, and should have been decided before this 
date. I apologize to counsel and parties for the delay, but as I explained at the close of argument, I 
can think of few more difficult decisions than one that raises the spectre of sanctions against a 
respected and able member of the Bar, and I have taken perhaps excessive care in researching and 
deciding this matter for that reason. 
BACKGROUND 
The present Motion for Rule 11 sanctions arises from plaintiffs Complaint in this action, 
which asserts two Causes of Action. The first is styled "Condemnation," and the second 
"Declaration of Highway by Use." The Complaint was filed July 12, 2007. Defendants moved to 
dismiss the claims, and plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Following 
argument on December 19, 2007,1 dismissed both claims on the basis of res judicata (the 2001 
action), and denied plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. I denied defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss on the alternative grounds of judicial estoppel, and because I decided the 
Motion based on res judicata, I expressly did not reach defendants' separate claims that the Cause 
of Action for condemnation should be dismissed because (1) plaintiff has no authority to condemn 
defendants' property, or (2) the proposed condemnation is not for a public use. (See Order 
entered Februaiy 20, 2008). 
I will not recite fee history of this case. It is well-summarized in the briefing, and for more 
^5 
details reference should be made to my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 23, 
2002, and the Judgment dated and entered September 24,2002, in the prior action, and the 
subsequent Court of Appeals opinion found at 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57 (UtCtApp. 2005). 
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF RULE 11 
Although defendants* original Motion at least referaiced Rule 11(b)(2) (non-frivolous 
basis in law) and (3) (factual claims must have evidentiary support) (Memorandum in Support 
dated August 6, 2007, p. 6), as the briefing evolved (and after the court granted the Motion to 
Dismiss), the focus shifted to Rule 11(b)(1) (improper purpose) and (2) (non-frivolous basis in 
law). (Reply Memorandum dated March 5, 2008) Defendants identify factual problems 
contained in plaintiffs arguments opposing the sanctions Motion, but they do not specifically 
argue that the tacts alleged m the Complaint initiating *Vnc ^Hion lack evidentiary support or "are 
[not] likely to .have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery/ (Kuie Li(p)(i)). 
After considering all of the filings in this case, I cannot say that the facts underlying the 
nineteen specific allegations in the Complaint are not likely to have evidentiary support (which is 
not the same as saying those facts would be persuasive, but that is not the standard), particularly in 
light of the more than 100 years of history upon which plaintiff appears to rely. The one 
allegation that skates closest to the line is No. 1: "Gillmor's property is essentially landlocked." 
That allegation appears inconsistent with my Findings of Fact m the prior action, but die word 
"essentially" at least opens (lie door to a determination through investigation and discovery that 
the alternate routes are so impractical, at least for the purposes desired, that the land may be 
"essentially" landlocked Defendants also note that the defendants are not all of the surrounding 
landowners, but that suggestion appears only in a memorandum, and not in the Complaint. At 
paragraphs 16 and 17 plaintiff makes the relevant allegations; namely, that defendants own the 
land between plaintiffs property and the Weber Canyon Road, and that the Perdue Creek and Neil 
Creek roads run across defendants' properties. These are probably accurate statements. 
For the foregoing reasons, I will not analyze the Rule 11 Motion under sub-sections (b)(3) 
or (4), but will limit analysis to sub-sections (b)(1) and (2). With this in mind, I note that any 
monetary sanctions under subsection (b)(2) may only be imposed on counsel, Mr. Baird, but that 
if I find a violation of subsection (b)(1), sanctions (monetary or other) may be assessed against 
either or both Ms. Gillmor and Mr. Baird. (Rule 11(c)(2)(A), U.R.C.P.) 
IMPROPER PURPOSE, RULE 11 (b)(l) 
The Rule states that an action may "not [be] presented for any improper purpose, such as 
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Rule 
11(b)(1). 
The defendants bear the burden of showing the improper purpose. The recent case law 
(since at least 1998 with the Pennington case, through 2005 with Mt. Vida) creates some 
confusion, at least in my mind, whether a Rule 11(b)(1) claim requires a showing of subjective 
bad faith^ There is no question, either now or in 1998, that under the previously codified § 78-27-
56 (now § 78B-5-825), an action must be without merit, and brought m bad faith (or an absence of 
good faith) and the standard is subjective good or bad faith. See, Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 
932, 938, n 3 (Utah 1998), Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah 1983), and Still Standing 
Stable, LLC, v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005). 
Plaintiff argues that the standard is the same under both § 78-27-56 and Rule ] 1(b)(1). 
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Defendants argue that it is not. Both have support. In Pennington, the court stated that: "[RJule 
11 sanctions do not require a party to act with a lack of good faith/' 973 P.3d at 938, n.3. In Mt. 
Vida Enterprises v. Steen, 2005 UT App. 400, 122 P.3d 144 (Ut.Ct.App. 2005), the Court of 
Appeals stated that: u[B]oth of these theories [Rule 11 and abuse of process], like Utah Code 
section 78-27-56(1), would require a showing of bad faith or its equivalent." Id. at 149, n.6. 
I cannot readily reconcile the two cases, except to note that one is the Utah Supreme court, 
and it should control, but perhaps the difference is not material in this case. That is, all cases that 
address the improper purpose standard under either Rule 11(b)(1) or the statute appear to treat the 
issue as one of fact, see, e.g. Pennington, 973 P.2d at 936, which implies an evidentiary hearing
 fc 
(either the underlying trial or a specific hearing on the fee motion), and I have never awarded § 
78-27-56 fees without such a hearing.1 
The language of Rule 11(b)(1) (set forth above) suggests at least some overlap between the 
standards of the Rule, and § 78-27-56. That is, Utah courts have defined the statutory standard 
with some specificity: To show a lack of good faith, or the existence of bad faith, for purposes of 
§ 78-27-56, it must be shown that one of the following three factors is lacking: 
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others. 
Still Standing Stable, 122 P.3d at 560 (quoting In re Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, ] 48, 86 P.3d 712 
(Utah 2004). 
Under § 78-27-56, the necessary bad faith inquiry is identified in Cadv v, Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149 (Utah 1983) and subsequent cases. It is not a simple standard, it is factual, and parties have been 
warned by (he Utah Supreme Court to avoid conflating the two requirements of lack of merit and bad 
faith into one. See Still Standing Stable. LLC, v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005). 
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Whether the standard is subjective bad faith, as identified, above, or objective improper 
purpose, the record in this case does not provide a sufficient basis to attribute either such motive 
to plaintiff or Mr. Band. In the present case, I see no evidence of a purpose to harass, delay or 
impose unnecessary cost. The purpose is clear-to obtain access that has not been obtained 
through previously advanced theories. Neitiier can I find sufficient evidence in the record to show 
the absence of an honest belief that the action might be justified, or thai the action was filed to 
take unconscionable advantage of defendants. There is no question that the action (the present 
and prior actions, in fact) have cost defendants very large sums, but 1 .cannot conclude that there 
was ever, now or in the past, a purpose to needlessly increase the costs of litigation, 
Finally, I note that defendants point to statements of what actions may be brought in the 
future, by other parties who may or may not be represented by Mr. Baird, but until such actions 
are filed there is no way for this court to assess the merits of such actions, and I do not see how 
the threat of such actions shows the improper purpose required by the Rule. Excessive zeal in a 
cause is not necessarily an improper purpose or evidence of bad faith, and I hereby DENY the 
sanctions Motion based on Rule 11(b)(1), U.R.C J\ What may require sanctions, however, is an 
action prompted by sucn zeal, but which cannot be legally justified by this plaintiff against these 
defendants, and that is the next inquiry. 
WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW, RULE 11(b)(2) 
I start this section by clarifying that I am not now addressing whether the two claims 
advanced by plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor, have any basis in law, or a in a reasonable extension of 
existing law. For the sake of argument (but only for that purpose) I will concede that one or both 
theories, highway by use or private condemnation, may be viable. The sole inquiry hi the context 
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of this case, with its mexlncable ties to the prioi action (and, indeed, to the settlement of the 1984 
action that is icferenced throughout the record), is whether Nadme Gillmor had a basis in law, 01 
m a reasonable extension of existing law, to bung a new action seeking increased access to her 
pioperty ovei and across the defendants' pioperties Stated a little differently, is there an 
objectively ieasonable basis m law justifying this new appioach to Ms Gillmoi's appaiently 
intractable pioblem of how to obtain access to hei property that meets hei needs and desires? 
I will start by sketching the law of les judicata 
The doctnne of res judicata serves the impoitant policy of preventing previously 
litigated issues fiom being lehtigated Res judicata encompasses two distinct doctunes 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion 
Generally, claim preclusion bais a party from piosecutmg m a subsequent action a 
claim that has been fully litigated previously In oider for a claim to be piecluded undei 
this doctnne the paity seeking preclusion must establish three elements 
Fust, both cases must involve the same parties or then pnvies Second the claim 
that is alleged to be baned must have been piesentcd m the first suit 01 be one that 
could and should have been 1 aised in the first action Third, the fust suit must 
have lesulted m a final judgment on the meats 
Snvdeiv Murray City Corporation. 2003 UT 13, % 34, 73 P 3d 325, 332 (Utah 2003) (all internal 
citations omitted, emphasis added) 
I will not define issue nr^Hmirm because that doctrine is not the specific bai to plaintiffs 
piesent action Addressing the three elements of claim preclusion (1) This action involves the 
same parties and/oi privies as the pnoi action (2) The claim foi access ovei the pioperties was 
the heart of the pnoi action It is plaintiffs aigument that (a) the piesent legal theories supporting 
access weie not presented m the pnoi action, which they were not, and (b) there was no need to 
aigue the piesent theories until this court and the Utah Court of Appeals ruled against plaintiffs 
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claims which were advanced through different theories. Both arguments fail, because the present 
arguments were always available (and according to plaintiff they have been legally and factually 
available for many decades), and the claims or theories could and should have been presented in 
Hie first case, either as alternative theories, or as the theories that best fit the facts alleged. (3) 
There is no question that the prior action was folly adjudicated, at trial, on appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and through denial of a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The foregoing is a brief statement of this court's reason for dismissing the present action, 
and I am at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought the present action without 
violating Rule 11(b)(2), U.RCi\ That is, once the three elements are satisfied, I am unaware of 
any exceptions to application of the bar imposed by res judicata, and plaintiff has not identified 
any such exception. She argues, as already noted, 1hat fter present "legal causes of action . .. were 
utterly unnecessary" until the Court of Appeals mled against her, but that argument only suggests 
that litigation choices were made, as they should be, and not every possible theory was advanced. 
Nevertheless, the claim for access was aggressively pursued, and resolved. Res judicata has 
several purposes, one of which is "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits/* 
Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P. 845 P.2D 944, 946 (Ut.CtApp. 1992). 
If an appellate court disagrees with my application of the doctrine of res judicata to the 
present action, then any determination of a violation of Rule 11(b)(2), and imposition of 
sanctions, will be similarly flawed, but unless and until that happens, I am constrained to follow 
ibe logic of the underlying dismissal, and my analysis of Rule 11(b)(2), to find that the present 
action was filed in contravention ol the Rule, l note the particular force of Schoney v. Memorial 
EstatesvInc, 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Ut.ui./^p. 1993), in support of this conclusion, 
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To summarize, I do not disagree that Mr. Baird's research of underlying theories may not, 
in fact, be flawed perse. Indeed, one or both theories may support his conclusion that some 
plaintiff, some day, may have an argument for a highway by use or private condemnation claim. I 
do not reach that issue. The flaw in the filing is that this plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor, may not now 
bring such a claim, because of the prior fully litigated claims between these parties or their 
privies The res judicata bar is clear, it is ancient, and it applies conclusively in this case. Ms. 
Gillmor has had her day in court on the claims presented in this action, albeit presented now in a 
new form. 
SANCTIONS 
Because the only Rule violated in this case is Rule 11(b)(2), a monetary sanction may not 
be imposed against Ms. Gillmor. Monetary sanctions may be imposed against Mr. Baird, counsel 
for plaintiff, and other sanctions may be imposed against either or both Mr. Baird and Ms, 
Gillmor. The Rule specifically provides that: ilA sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall 
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by 
others similarly situated." (Rule 11(c)(2)) Sanctions may include "an order directing payment of 
some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the 
violation.5' Id. 
Defendants have all sought payment of attorney's fees, and the affidavits to date support 
very substantial amounts incurred, all related to the filing of this action and defendants* successful 
motions to dismiss. The courts have, however, given guidance on the meaning oi.the-sanctkin^ 
language, and the purpose of sanctions, which guidance persuades me that an award of all hes and 
costs is not mandated by the Rule, and this court should exercise its sound discretion in 
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determining the appropriate sanction. See, e.g. Pennington v. Allstate, y/3 jf.2d yj2, y3y (Utah 
1998), and Schonev v. Memorial Estates, Inc. 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993). Specifically, "a 
violation of Rule 11(b) does not mandate the sanction of attorney fees/' Crank v. The Utah 
Judicial Council 2001 UT 8, 20 P.3d 307, 316 (Utah 2001). 
federal tfases give further direction. Some of the guiding principles include the following: 
"The purpose of sanctions under Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings and streamline the 
administration of justice Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). Sanctions 
should therefore be educational and rehabilitative in character and, as such, tailored to the 
particular wrong, Topalian v Ehiman. 3 F.3d 931, 936-37 (5Jh Cir. 1993)." Jordaan v. Hall, 275 
F.Supp.2d 778, 790-91 (RD.Tex. 2003). Finally, "Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute in the 
sense that the loser pays. It is a law imposing sanctions if counsel files with improper motives or 
inadequate investigation.5' Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Qr 
1989) {en banc). 
In tins case, plaintiff did not obtain the properly access she sought in the 2001 action, 
which in turn interpreted the settlement agreement arising from a 1984 action. In this action, new 
and experienced counsel advanced theories not asserted in Ube prior action, but which could have 
been, in an attempt to gain rights of access probably even greater than argued for in the 2001 
action, or bargained for in prior agreements. 1 have found that the action is not legally justified, at 
least not an action brought by JMadine Gillmor to expand her access rights across the land owned 
by defendants. Nothing in the proceedings in this action persuades mc that Ms, Gillmor will seek 
personally to advance such an action in her name, but it is patently clear that she may seek to 
create certain rights to access through others. I do not see how sanctions seeking to deter Ms, 
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Gillmor or Mr. Baixd from such an effort are justified by Rule 11 if the action is otherwise 
justified, but a sanction should be imposed in this case, pursuant to the Rule, to deter others 
generally from bringing claims barred by either claim preclusion or issue preclusion, when all the 
elements are present. 
I determine that Mr, Baird, counsel for plaintiff, shall pay $5,000 each to the Macey and 
Richards defendants, and $2,500 to the Dohring defendants, for a total of $12,500.00. As an 
additional sanction, Nadine Gillmor is hereby enjoined from filing any further action seeking 
access to her property, or modification of the access she presently enjoys, across any of the 
defendants' properties unless she first seeks leave of court to file such an action, with notice to all 
intended defendants, ha any request for such leave, Ms. Gillmor is ordered to reveal the full 
history of agreements and litigation, including tire 2001 action, this action, and the sanctions 
imposed herein. 
No further Order is required, but defendants' counsel shall prepare appropriate Judgments 
based on this Order, which judgments will provide for post-judgment interest at tire 2008 rate 
from the date of this Order. The court, however, further Orders -that any execution of judgments 
shall be stayed until the appeal time from this Order and the underlying dismissal Order has 
expired. If a timely appeal is filed, then plaintiff shall have ten business davs to seek a further stay 
on appeal, and the parties may address the issue of any appropriate bond at that time. 
DATBD this 30th day of June, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070500385 by the method and on the date 
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This matter came before the Court on December 19,2007, on defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. Family Link, LLC, Kenneth W. Macey 
and Robin A. Macey (the "Maceys") were represented by Keith W, Meade. David K. Richards 
("Richards5') was represented by Elizabeth T, Dunning, Doug Carl Dohring and Laurie Ann 
Dohring (the "Dohrings") were represented by Edwin C. Barnes. Plaintiff Nadine Gillmor 
("Gillmor") was represented by Bruce R. Baird, At the conclusion of fee hearing, the Court 
granted defendants' Motion. The Court's ruling was memorialized in an Order, dated February 
19, 2008. Thereafter, the Maceys and Richards, joined by the Dohrings, moved for sanctions 
against Gillmor and her counsel pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Court heard 
argument on defendants' Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to U.R.C.P 11 on April 4, 2008, and 
entered its Ruling and Order on July 1,2008, granting in part and denying in part defendants' 
Motion, 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits; 
2. The Maceys are awarded $5,000 against Bruce R. Baird; 
3. Richards is awarded $5,000 against Bruce R. Baird; 
4. The Dohrings are awarded $2,500 against Bruce R. Baird; 
5. Plaintiff Gillmor is hereby enjoined from filing any further action seeking 
access to her property or modification of the access she presently enjoys, across any of 
the Defendants' properties, unless she first seeks leave of court to file such action, with 
notice to all intended defendants. In any request for such leave to file suit, Gillmor must 
2 3 7 
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reveal the full history of agreements and litigation, including the 2001 action, this action 
and the sanctions imposed by this Judgment, 
6. The monetary awards shall bear interest at the post-judgment rale 
beginning July 1,2008 until satisfied, 
7, Defendants are awarded their costs. 
Dated M^° day ofJkd5^£008. 
BY THE COURT: 
BKncfrable Robert K. Hilder 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Bruce R. Baird 
«*><m/n v\ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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